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Abstract: 
 
PRC’s energy dependence is growing and has become a major concern for both economic 
and national security policymakers in that country. The ambitious goal of modernization 
of the economy along the lines of the other newly industrialized economies(NIEs) of Asia 
has succeeded only too well, and it is difficult to reorient economic priorities. 
 If examined rigorously, such an economic strategic assumption can be seen to entail the 
goal of creating further technological capabilities. In particular, China seems to be firmly 
committed to the creation of a largely self-sustaining innovation system as part of a 
knowledge-based economy of the future . Such innovation systems, called positive 
feedback loop innovation systems or POLIS have been created by advanced countries, 
and NIEs such as South Korea and Taiwan are proceeding to create these as well. But this 
will add to its energy burden and further dependence on the US as the power which 
controls the key sea lanes. Only a strategic reorientation to building a self-sustaining 
POLIS  and appropriate regional cooperation institutions can lead to the way out of the 







China’s  remarkable growth during the last twenty five years has led to a rapid increasae 
in energy demand, and its hunger for energy is apparently insatiable. There are of course 
both economic  and ecological aspects of this insatiable  demand for energy. There are 
also security issues that exercise the Chinese leadership increasingly. In this paper I 
examine the measures that China is taking to achieve energy security and the motivations 
behind these measures. I also look at China's investment in overseas oil exploration and 
development projects, interest in transnational oil pipelines, plans for a strategic 
petroleum reserve, expansion of refineries to process crude supplies from the Middle East, 
development of the natural gas industry, and gradual opening of onshore drilling areas to 
foreign oil companies. The key question is: can China hope to achieve both equitable 
growth and energy security  over the next two decades? I suggest the kind of  
mathematical modeling and political economy analysis that may be necessary to answer 
this two-pronged question rigorously. 
 
China faces at least two pressing sets of energy policy challenges. The first is a problem 
of short run efficiency and  therefore relates to the immediate need to improve 
management and coordination of the nation’s energy supply. During the last five years 
economic growth has been close to 8% per annum. At the same time, energy demand 
grew by about 15% annually while oil imports grew at 30% per year. In today’s China, 
electrical power shortages are widespread, and transport bottlenecks constrain the ability 
of the industry to move both coal and oil to where they are needed.  
There are also longer term  energy policy challenges.   These concern the continuing 
inability of China’s government to formulate a coherent energy policy which could 
provide the basis for the effective management of the energy sector and its environmental 




China’s entry into the WTO has already had and in the future will have diverse 
consequences for its economy and energy. The best overall assessment from the Chinese 
perspective is that although the short run adjustment costs--- for example, the increase in 
unemployment in the agricultural sector--- may be high, the long run economic benefits 
from integration into the world trading system are likely to be considerable. In particular, 
it is assumed that the export-led growth will continue and will also lead to the 
modernization of the economy along the lines of the other newly industrialized 
economies(NIEs) of Asia. If examined rigorously, such an assumption can be seen to 
entail the goal of creating further technological capabilities. In particular, China seems to 
be firmly committed to the creation of a largely self-sustaining innovation system as part   4
of a knowledge-based economy of the future (Simon,1996; Simon and Goldman,1989; 
Lu, 2000). Such innovation systems, called positive feedback loop innovation systems or 
POLIS(Khan, 1998; 2003; 2004a) have been created by advanced countries, and NIEs 
such as South Korea and Taiwan are proceeding to create these as well.
1 Can China do 
the same? And will China’s entry into the WTO help or hinder such efforts? While the 
answers here are not clear, it is reasonable to say that its WTO membership
2 will open the 
way towards diversification of energy import sources. However, I will argue that much 
depends on US-China bilateral relationship also. Furthermore, as I will show, the current 
strategy of indiscriminate growth only without regards to sustainability or equity will 
make China’s growth is deeply problematic even in an open economy context of rules-
based trading in the WTO framework.  
 
 
In what follows, I will begin by identifying the most important aspects of the energy 
demand and supply aspects in order to ascertain China’s energy dependence. This will 
enable us to look at both economic welfare and sustainability issues as well as security 
issues which are discussed in section 3. In conclusion I draw attention to the real dilemma 
faced by the ambitious Chinese leaders and suggest that multilateralism and regional 
cooperation are the best strategic responses available to China. 
 
 
2. China’s energy dilemma: demand, supply and distributional issues 
 
 
China is now the world’s second largest consumer of energy, accounting for some 12% 
of global energy demand, but its rate of increase of demand is some four to five times that 
for the rest of the world. So what happens in China’s energy sector will affect the rest of 
the world as well. Table 1 below gives a picture of China’s actual and projected energy 
consumption till the year 2015.  
China’s energy sector displays continuing dependence on coal. China is the world’s 
largest consumer of coal, accounting for more than 30% of global coal consumption. 
Further, coal provides approximately 64% of China’s primary energy demand. While 
such dependence on coal is not necessarily a huge problem, it has two  unfortunate 
consequences. Use of coal is characterized by low energy efficiency and pollution.  
                                                 
1 A formal and complete description of POLIS as an innovation system ,and contrasts with NIS(national 
innovation system) of which POLIS is both an extension and an extended critique, is outside the scope of 
this paper. Khan (2004a) gives a formal description and two existence theorems in topological spaces. 
Technically, non-linearities and multiple equilibria are at the heart of a formal proof of POLIS and its 
properties. Khan (2003) presents both  a conceptual and concrete critique of NIS by comparing and 
contrasting the national innovation system ( NIS) with POLIS in the context of Taiwan. 
2 For welfare aspects of China’s entry into WTO see Khan, Haider A., "China's Entry into the WTO: ICT 
Sectors, Innovation, Growth and Distribution", July (2002b) - (Website address: 
http://www.e.utokyo.ac.jp/cirje/index.htm)  
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The  intrinsic energy value of a unit weight of coal is known to be less than that for oil 
and gas.The recovery rates for many of China’s coal mines are also low, meaning that 
much of the country’s coal resource is left in the ground, never to be recovered. Table 1 
below  confirms this. Furthermore, the efficiency of appliances which use coal in China 
continues to be substantially lower than the average in OECD countries. Progress has 
been slow in enhancing the efficiency of consumer electrical appliances and 
implementing building codes which reduce heat losses. Finally, the continuing low level 






















From table 1 above it is clear that China’s energy consumption will be 4 times what it 
was in 1980 by the year 2015.The share of oil during the same period will be on the 
increase also.China shifted from being  net oil exporter to net oil importer in 1993.What 
explains the increasing dependence on oil? Table 2 below is an input-output 
decomposition of China’s energy use. Scrutinizing  table 2 below we can see that it is   6
intimately related to final demand shift. Within the final demand shift, both household 
and investment needs are responsible for the lion’s share. Thus, China’s industrialization 
strategy and the increasing prosperity of households can explain its increasing 

























Table 2   7




Although domestic production figures have not been projected till 2015 in table 3 above, 
simple extrapolation would show that import dependence is here to stay. Thus the 
conclusion that follows from the evidence presented in tables 1 and 2 seems to be that 
China’s  import dependence will be a policy problem for at least till 2025, if not for even 
a longer period. The vulnerability is great as shown in table 4. 
Table 4 
   9
Table 4 which is taken from the scenarios run by the EIA and the RAND corporation 
shows the effects on GDP when prices shift unfavorably affecting supply and production. 
In the appendix, I outline a model that looks at the distributional impacts of such 
disruptions in a linear approximation scenario. In particular, poverty impacts are derived. 
The preliminary results suggest strongly that almost all of Chinaa’s growth induced 
poverty reduction gains can be destroyed through disruptions in the energy markets alone. 
For China’s policy makers this must be a sobering thought. What options are available to 
them? In the next section, I review and assess the steps taken and suggest a strategy most 
likely to succeed. 
 
 
3. China’s energy dilemma: strategic moves 
 
 
China’s energy dilemma has renewed concerns about long term  energy security. Several 
decades ago, the same concerns existed but the solution was also clear and simple--- to 
increase domestic production. Our analysis indicates that this is no longer a viable 
option.
3 Discovery of large reserves is unlikely. Thus oil is seen as a source of 
vulnerability in Beijing. Since plans for building a POLIS depend crucially on oil, it 
could make China  vulnerable to foreign pressures. Many years of debate within the state 
council has not resolved this difficult problem. Policy makers have been divided over 
whether domestic production should be increased or explore for oil abroad. In practice 
both the paths are being followed. I will argue that neither is going to reduce vulnerability 
to a large extent soon. In the medium to long run, however, there is a third option 
available; but it will require both rethinking development priorities at home and 
reorienting diplomacy towards greater regional cooperation. But let us look at the 
existing divided strategy. 
 
The centerpiece of the current strategy seems to be an ambitious scheme of investment in 
overseas oil projects together with continuing domestic exploration. The state owned oil 
companies of China are the key players in both arenas.During the 1980s China launched 
three large oil companies. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation(CNOOC) has 
controlled most of the offshore oil businesses since its founding in 1982. The China 
National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) was founded in 1983 and is responsible 
for refining and marketing. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was 
founded in 1988 by the ministry of petroleum industry. In 1998 the government 
reorganized CNPC and Sinopec and created two vertically integrated oil 
companies.However, CNPC is still China’s dominant upstream oil company and Sinopec 
the main downstream company in the industry. 
 
Initially, the government maintained a two-tiered pricing policy that required CNPC to 
sell to its industrial customers at a fraction of the market price. The resulting cash flow 
constraint led to limited exploration. In 1993, the government relaxed the pricing policy 
increasing the first tier crude price. CNPC was the main beneficiary, as indeed was the 
                                                 
3 See also Christoffersen (1998) for an analysis of the situation particularly with respect to China’s relations 
with Russia and Central Asia in historical perspective.   10
intention. CNPC officials knew that unless the money was quickly invested it would be 
confiscated. The coincidental appointment of Zhou Yongkang who favored foreign 
investment led to overseas expansion of investment.
4 Since this time, views of top CNPC 
officials have mattered a great deal in China’s foreign energy investments. However, they 
are chosen ultimately by the Communist Party leadership. Hence it can be rightly said 
that the Party is the final arbiter. 
 
 
Among other things CNPC has invested from Canada to Kazakhstan. In 1997 it pledged 
over $8 billion for oil concessions in Canada, Venezuela, Iraq and the Sudan. Such 
activities underline the high priority attached to these projects. They can also lead to 
increasing tension between China and the US. For example, in 1997, CNPC acquired a 
sixty per cent stake in Kazakhstan’s Aktyubinskmunaigaz Production Association. CNPC 
beat out Texaco, Amoco and Russia’s Yujnimost by agreeing to pay $320 million bonus 
to the Kazakh government and to conduct a feasibility study on the construction of an 
1800 mile pipeline to Western China. This was estimated to cost $ 3.5 billion.In 
September 1997, CNPC followed similar tactics to defeat Petronas, Unocal and Amoco to 
win a controlling interest in Uzen, Kazakhstan’s second largest oilfield with reserves of 
1.5 bb.  
 
In June 1997, a consortium of Chinese oil companies signed a 22-year production sharing 
contract with Iraq to develop half of the Al-Ahdab field after thhe lifting of UN sanctions. 
Al-Ahdab is the country’s second largest oilfield.Prior to the US invasion of Iraq, CNPC 
was negotiating for rights to develop three other Iraqi fields. These are Halfaya, Luhais 
and Suba. 
 
However, the US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation has put these plans in 
great jeopardy.The global energy situation is now marked by even more uncertainty and 
the Chinese must feel more vulnerable than ever. It is always possible that US 
imperialism will fail like all imperialist powers to ultimately control the middle eastern 
oil or even the sea routes permanently. But the realists in China must know that the 
current situation is one of US dominance. Apart from its domestic snafus reflected in the 
facts such as that Kazakhstan-China pipeline plans were shelved in 1999, the US 
preeminence as a military power and its willingness to use this power for various 
purposes including protecting control over overseas oil, China’s energy dependence 
seems logically to lead to dependence on the US hegemony. What is the way out? I 
suggest that rethinking development strategy and increasing regional cooperation offer 
the best hope for China. 
 
Strategically, Chinese development path has been so far marked by the East Asian 
model.According to this model heavy state involvement together with the promotion of 
market led industrialization through export promotion is the best strategy for 
development. As an industrialization strategy, this can succeed up to a point. However, as 
                                                 
4 For a detailed description see, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg . 1998. Policy Making in China: 
Leaders, Structures, and Processes , Princeton: , Princeton University Press. 
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the Asian financial crisis demonstrated, there are risks as well (Khan1997, 1998, 2004 a 
and b).The Chinese strategy has led to high growth and a lopsided distribution together 
with energy dependence. Following this path further without qualification, as the current 
leadership seems to have grasped, will exacerbate the negative aspects with the inevitable 
growth  slowdown. However, there is an alternative which I have developed in detail 
elsewhere. Here I will merely sketch the main outline. 
 
In my development of an alternative strategy(Khan 1983, 1982a and b, 1997,1998, 2002, 
2003, 2004 a and b; Khan and Sonko 1994) based among others on an extension of  
Schumpeterian theory of innovation and Sen’s capabilities, the key is a distributionally 
sensitive approach with clear recognition of ecological constraints.The main idea is to 
moderate the growth rate and hence short term dependence on fossil fuels and minimize 
consequent ecological problems.With a proper poverty reduction strategy---called 
‘growth plus’strategy
5--- the adverse distributional consequences from moderate growth 
can be avoided. In fact, with a properly moderate ‘growth plus’strategy, the capabilities 
of the great majority of the poulation caan be enhanced along with the productive 
capacity. This will lead to the creation of a domestic market for commodities that are 
produced in a much more ecologically sustainable manner. Furthermore, the goal of a 
transition to a relatively non-fossil fuel based knowledge and information economy will 
be facilitated and the transition will occur more quickly and smoothly under the proposed 
POLIS strategy. 
 
The question of domestic market creation leads also to considerations of cooperation in 
Asia. For reasons of regional financial stability, reciprocal exporting and  energy security 
greater cooperation in each of these spheres is an urgent necessity. China along with the 
other countries in Northeast Asia must proceed to diffuse tensions and build up regional 
institutions. Given the historic hostilities this will be no easy task. Yet the enlightened 
self-interests of the countries together with imperatives of regional peace and prosperity 
lead logically towards cooperation. There is much here to learn from European 
integration experience, particularly about the role of enlightened leadership. No doubt, 
there are special Asian features and special Asian roadblocks that might require particular 
Asian approaches to negotiation and conflict resolution at times. But China’s energy 
dilemma is one compelling reason for that country to take the initiative and start a 
dialogue. There is no time to lose. 
 
4. Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
In this paper I have sketched the energy dilemma for China in this century. As long as the 
current geopolitical situation persists the pursuit of present development strategy of 
China will further increase its energy dependence.For both political and economic 
reasons China needs to rethink its development strategy. I have sketched such an 
alternative strategy that relies much less on fossil fuels and emphasizes regional 
cooperation. This POLIS strategy will ultimately lead to a sustainable economy based on 
growth with equity. A transition to a non- fossil fuel based knowledge and information 
economy will also be easier to effect under the proposed strategy.  
                                                 
5 This is discussed in detail in chapter 1 of Khan and Weiss, forthcoming.   12
 
However, time is of the essence. Given the path dependence of development unless 
strategic disengagement from the existing path followed by a strategic engagement with 
the alternative strategy is begun within the next five years, it may well be too late. The 
stakes are indeed very high. A  more detailed strategy paper based on the key ideas from 
the alternative strategy outlined here with concrete quantitative scenarios and feasibility 
studies along the lines of models sketched in the appendix ( and other, more detailed 
models) will go some distance towards  giving the appropriate analytical foundations for 








Appendix 1: Growth Impacts of the energy sectors--- A simple SAM-based Model 
 
Fixed Price Modeling in a SAM-based Framework: 
  In this section the Social Accounting Matrix is presented as a data gathering 
framework as well as an analytical tool for studying the effects the energy sectors on 
growth. Appendix two presents the methodology for estimating the impact of growth 
generated by the energy sectors on poverty alleviation.  The origins of social accounting 
can be traced as far back as Gregory King’s efforts in 1681, but more recent work stems 
from the attempts by Richard Stone, Graham Pyatt, Erik Thorkbecke and others. 
6 
In the methodological framework of this study the SAM is used for mapping 
production and distribution at the economy wide level.  In this section, first a general 
SAM is described.  Then it is shown how the method for studying the effect of growth 
within this framework follows logically from its structure.  The model used is a simple 
version of a class of SAM-based general equilibrium models.
7  It summarizes succinctly 
the interdependence between productive activities, factor shares, household income 
distribution, balance of payments, capital accounts, etc. for the economy as a whole at a 
point in time.  Given the technical conditions of production the value added is distributed 
to the factors in a determinate fashion.  The value added accrued by the factors is further 
received by households according to their ownership of assets and the prevailing wage 
structure.  In the matrix form the SAM consists of rows and columns representing 
receipts and expenditures, respectively.  As an accounting constraint receipts must equal 
expenditures. 
  As is elaborated further in Khan and Thorbecke (1988), the SAM framework can 
be used to depict a set of linear relationships in a fixed coefficient model.  For deciding 
the question of determination, the accounts need to be divided into exogenous and 
endogenous ones.  For instance, in the China SAM, there are three endogenous accounts.  
These are factors, households and production activities, leaving the government, capital 
and the rest of the world accounts as exogenous.
8 
                                                 
6 For a description of SAM as a data gathering device, see G. Pyatt and E. Thorbecke, Planning Techniques 
for a Better Future (Geneva:  ILO, 1976). Khan(1997) also has a chapter on this alone. 
7In Walrasian general equilibrium models the flexible price vector determines the equilibrium.  In a 
Keynesian (dis)equilibrium model in the short-run the quantities vary while the price vector remains fixed. 
8 See Khan and Thorbecke, op.cit., Ch. II for more theoretical details and empirical examples.  The 
presentations here follow the cited work closely.     15
 
 
Table 1: Simplified Schematic Social Accounting Matrix  
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  Looking at Table 2, which represents a SAM, we can see immediately that 
y = n + x     (1) 
y = 1 + t     (2)   16
Now if we divide the entries in the matrix Tnn by the corresponding total income (i.e. yn), 
we can define a corresponding matrix of average expenditure propensities.  Let us call 
this matrix A.  We now have: 
y = n + x = Ay + x   (3) 
y = (1-A)
-1x = Mx   (4) 
M has been called the matrix of accounting multipliers by Thorbecke, for these 
multipliers, when computed, can account for the results (e.g. income, consumption, etc.) 
obtained in the SAM without explaining the process that led to them.  Let us now 
partition the matrix A in the following way.
9 
                                                 
9 Ibid.   17
 
  ⎡0   0   A13  ⎤ 
  ⎜               ⎥ 
A=  ⎜A21   A 22    0     ⎥   (5) 
  ⎜                ⎥ 
  ⎣0   A32   A 33  ⎦ 
 
Table 2: Schematic Representation of Endogenous and Exogenous Accounts in a SAM  
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Source: H.A. Khan and E. Thornbecke, Choice and Diffusion of Technology in a 
Macroeconomic (SAM)   Framework 
 
 
Given the accounts factors, household and the production activities, now we see that the 
income levels of these accounts (call them y1, y2, y3 respectively) are determined as 
functions of the exogenous demand of all other accounts.  In this respect, what we have is 
a reduced-form model which can be consistent with a number of structural forms.  This is 
quite satisfactory as far as tracing the effects of a certain injection in the economy is 
concerned or for prediction purposes when the structural coefficients are more or less 
unchanged. 
  One limitation of the accounting multiplier matrix M as derived in equation (2.2) 
is that it implies unitary expenditure elasticities (the prevailing average expenditure 
propensities in A are assumed to apply to any incremental injection).  A more realistic 
alternative is to specify a matrix of marginal expenditure propensities (Cn below) 
corresponding to the observed income and expenditure elasticities of the different agents, 
under the assumption that prices remain fixed.  The Cn matrix can be partitioned in the 
same way as the A matrix above.  The most important difference between the two   18
partitioned  matrix is that C32 ≠ A32.  Expressing the changes in income (dy) resulting 
from changes in injections (dx), one obtains,  
dyn = Cndyn + dx    (6) 
      = (I - Cn)
-1 dx = Mcdx (7) 
Mc has been called a fixed price multiplier matrix and its advantage is that it allows any 
nonnegative income and expenditure elasticities to be reflected in Mc.  In particular, in 
exploring the macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in the output of different 
product-cum-technologies on other macroeconomic variables, it would be very unrealistic 
to assume that consumers react to any given proportional change in their incomes by 
increasing expenditures on the different commodities by exactly that same proportion 
(i.e. assuming that the income elasticities of demand of the various socioeconomic 
household groups for the various commodities were all unity).  Since the expenditure 
(income) elasticity is equal to the ratio of the marginal expenditure propensity (MEPi) to 
the average expenditure propensity (AEPi) for any given good i, it follows that the 
marginal expenditure propensity can be readily obtained once the expenditure elasticity 
and the average expenditure propensities are known, i.e.,  
yi = MEPi/AEPi    (8) 
MEPi = yi AEPi   (9) 
and ΣMEPi = 1    (10) 
       i 
 
Thus, given the matrix A32 of average expenditure propensities, and the corresponding 
expenditure elasticities of demand, yi the corresponding marginal expenditure 




                                                 
10See Khan and Thorbecke (1988) for some examples.  
See also G. Pyatt and J.I. Round, “Accounting and Fixed Price Multipliers in Social Acounting Matrix 
Framework,” Economic Journal Vol. 89, Dec. 1979, p. 861.   19
 
    
Appendix 2: Energy Sectors, Growth, Distribution and Poverty. 
Multiplier Decomposition,Growth and Poverty Alleviation Sensitivity 
  Since poverty in the present context is measured by identifying a poverty line in 
monetary terms incomes of the various household groups are the crucial variables.  In 
particular, sectoral growth generated by the energy sectors must be linked to incomes of 
the various households in order to determine the exact extent of the alleviation of poverty 
through growth.  The exact effect of income growth on poverty, of course, depends on the 
sensitivity of the adopted poverty measure to income.  In this paper the Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984) Pα class of additively decomposable poverty measure is selected for 
this purpose.  For α=0,1,n this measure becomes the headcount ratio, the poverty gap and 
a distributionally sensitive measure that gives specific weights to each poor person’s 
shortfall, respectively.   
  If we apply Kakwani’s (1993) decomposition to the Pα measure for specific  
sectors and households i and j respectively, the change in Pαij can be written as follows: 
                    
    dPαij  =   ∂Pαij  +     Σ  ∂Pαij   d θijk       (11) 
         ∂yi            
k=1
      ∂θijk                       
 
Here Pαij is the FGT Pα measure connecting sector j to household group i, yi is the mean 
per-capita income of household group i,  and θ ijk is the income distribution parameter.  
Under the unrealistic but simplifying assumption of distributional neutrality: 
d Pαij = ηαi⎛dyi⎞  (12) 
     Pαij              ⎝yi ⎠  
 
where ηαi  is the elasticity of Pij with respect to the mean per capita income of each 
household group i resulting from an increase in the output of sector j.  dyi on the right 
hand side is the change in mean per capita income of household group i.  This can be 
written as (by considering the fixed price multiplier matrix) 
 dyc = mij dxj   (13) 
 where  dxj is the change in the output of sector j on a per capita basis for group j. 
We can now rewrite the aηverage change in poverty measure as 
 d  Pαij= ηαimij  ⎛dxj⎞ (14) 
              Pαij               ⎝yi  ⎠ 
 
By aggregating across the household groups we can arrive at the overall poverty 
alleviation effect 
             
                        m                                         m 
d Pαj    Σ   ⎛dPαij⎞  ⎛ni⎞     Σ   ⎛dPαij⎞  ⎛Pαij⎞   (15) 
               Pαj = 
i=1   ⎝Pαij ⎠   ⎝n ⎠ =  
i=1   ⎝Pαij   ⎠  ⎝Pαj ⎠ 
Since we are considering a Pα measure  
           m 
dPαj = Σ    ⎛dPαij ⎞ ⎛Σ(z-yk)/z)
α ⎞   (16)   20
  Pαj       i=1     ⎝Pαij  ⎠  ⎝Σ(z-yl)/z)
α ⎠ 
 
                                                                                                                          m 
where qi is the number of poor in the ith group and the total number of poor q=Σqi 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
i=1
 
                                                                                               m 
Let sαi be the poverty share of household group i (naturally Σ sαi = 1) 
                                                                                               
i=1 
        qi                  q 
sαi = Σ⎛z-yk⎞
α  Σ   ⎛z-yl ⎞
α   (17)
 
           k=1⎝  z ⎠     
l=1    ⎝ z   ⎠
 
 
We can further rewrite the expression for the average change in overall poverty 
alleviation. 
           m 
dPαj = Σ ⎛dPαji⎞ sαi   (18)
 
 Pαj      
i=1  ⎝Pαij  ⎠
 
Combining equations 14 and 18 
we now have, 
dPαj = Σsαiηαi mij ⎛dxj ⎞   (19) 
 Pαj                                 ⎝ yi   ⎠ 
 
 
  Thorbecke and Jung(1996) separate the income increase via the modified 
multiplier effect from the sensitivity of the poverty measure formally in equation (19) by 
defining the following two entities:   
1.   m
/
αij = sαimij gives the modified multiplier effect in terms of income of a poor group. 
2.   qαij = ηαi(dxj/yi) represents the sensitivity of the poverty index to the change in 
income.  I adopt their terminology and call this the poverty sensitivity effect. 
But each multiplier mij can be further decomposed: 
mij=ηjdij     (20) 
where nj gives the (closed loop) interdependency effects and dij the distributional effects 
of a change in demand for the product of sector j on household group i. 
Thus, 
                m 
dPαj/Pαj = Σm
/
αijqαij   (21) 
    m 
= Σ(rαij) (sαijdij)(qαij)   (22) 
    
i 
The dij on the right hand side can be further decomposed by multiplicatively 
decomposing the total distributive effects. Given the structure of Cn matrix in section 2. 
D=D3D2D1 where D3= (I-C22)
-1; D2=C21C13, and D1=(I-C33) 
-1 
The particular element for each household i and sector j can be selected from these three 
matrices.   
  Thus the contribution of an increase in output of a particular sector j to poverty 
alleviation can be decomposed multiplicatively into its two components:  (i) the   21
contribution due to the change in mean income of the poor across all groups and (ii) the 
sensitivity of the particular poverty measure to this change in average income of the poor. 
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